In a recent video, Sebastian Sas offered his analysis on America’s approach to drone warfare. Sas’s discussion highlighted a key tension: while US officials speak of drone dominance, the realities of global production and historical military spending habits paint a more complex picture.

In the video, Sas showed a clip of US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announcing an executive order aimed at boosting American drone manufacturing. Hegseth acknowledged that adversaries have produced millions of inexpensive drones and stated that the US would respond by equipping its forces with low-cost, American-made drones¹. However, as Sas pointed out, this creates a subtle contradiction: dismissing other nations’ inexpensive drones while promoting domestically produced low-cost versions raises questions about the messaging itself.

The Drone Divide: Quantity Versus Quality

Sas’s core argument revolves around production capacity. While exact, real-time figures for drone output are constantly shifting and often classified, available information suggests a significant disparity. Sebastian Sas claimed the US produces 2,000 to 3,000 FPV drones monthly. The Pentagon recently announced changes to accelerate the fielding of small drones across the US military, treating certain types as consumables like ammunition, aiming for every squad to have low-cost, expendable drones by the end of 2026¹.

China, benefiting from its vast commercial drone manufacturing base and a military-civil fusion strategy, is capable of producing millions of units annually, as discussed by publications like Defense One². Russia, according to the Institute for the Study of War and other sources, has rapidly escalated its domestic drone production³. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on July 8, 2025, that Russia has more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025, largely due to state support and cooperation with Chinese companies³. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia is producing over 2,500 Shahed drones each month and over 5,000 long-range unmanned aerial vehicles overall per month⁴.

Beyond mere numbers, Sas emphasized that true effectiveness in drone warfare comes from extensive battlefield experience. Ukraine and Russia, due to the ongoing conflict, have become the primary proving grounds for drone tactics and development. This hands-on experience, involving trial and error and constant adaptation, is irreplaceable for developing effective drone strategies and for innovating on the fly. Producing advanced drones is not enough; their effective integration and use in combat are paramount.

The Legacy of the Military-Industrial Complex

Sas’s analysis also delved into the historical evolution of the Western military-industrial complex. After the Cold War, with the perceived absence of large-scale conventional conflicts, Western defense industries shifted focus. Instead of mass-producing affordable equipment, the emphasis moved towards developing highly advanced, often complex, and expensive weapon systems. This strategy, as detailed in analyses by organizations like the Costs of War Project at Brown University, was driven by profit motives and a focus on technological superiority over mass production⁹.

This shift has resulted in significantly reduced production capacities compared to historical wartime levels. For example, during World War II, US factories produced thousands of M4 Sherman tanks, with historical records indicating periods of extremely high output⁶. Today, manufacturing a single modern M1 Abrams tank can take between 18 to 24 months from order to delivery, highlighting the complexities of modern, advanced weapon systems and their supply chains⁷. This contrast underscores a major vulnerability for Western nations if they need to rapidly scale up production for a large-scale conflict.

The push for low-cost drones by the US, as highlighted by Secretary Hegseth, signals a recognition of this problem. However, as Sebastian Sas suggests, the military-industrial complex traditionally thrives on high-value contracts for complex systems. While the Pentagon is urging industry to build drones cheaper and faster, and categorize them as consumables rather than durable property¹⁵, the profit margins on individual low-cost drones can be smaller, necessitating massive volume for comparable overall revenue⁸. The influence of the arms industry, including through extensive lobbying and campaign contributions, often shapes defense spending decisions, as reported by organizations like Taxpayers for Common Sense¹⁰.

The Ukraine Conflict: A Glimpse of the Future

The conflict in Ukraine serves as a live laboratory for drone warfare. Both sides heavily rely on drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct attacks. Russian forces launched 2,736 Shahed-type drones in June 2025 alone, representing over 10% of their total usage since the full-scale invasion began, indicating an intensified aerial assault campaign³. Ukraine has also demonstrated effective use of drones, inflicting significant damage on Russian targets. The Atlantic Council has noted that Ukrainian innovations are redefining the role of drones in modern war, showcasing rapid development and deployment of various unmanned systems¹¹.

The ongoing debates among US lawmakers regarding military aid to Ukraine, and previous pauses in weapons shipments, can be seen through the lens of this evolving industrial and strategic landscape. A report from the Costs of War Project at Brown University highlighted that over half of the Pentagon’s discretionary spending from 2020 to 2024 went to military contractors, with arms transfers boosting their profits from aid to Ukraine and other allies⁹. Recent reports indicate President Trump expressed frustration with Pentagon officials for announcing a temporary pause in some weapons deliveries to Ukraine, due to concerns about American stockpiles¹².

Ultimately, the insights from Sebastian Sas’s video, supported by broader industry trends and conflict dynamics, underscore a critical challenge for Western militaries: adapting their industrial base and procurement strategies to meet the demands of a new era of warfare, where speed, volume, and cost-effectiveness in areas like drone technology are becoming as crucial as individual technological superiority.

Sources:

1. The War Zone. “Pentagon Just Made A Massive, Long Overdue Shift To Arm Its Troops With Thousands Of Drones.” July 10, 2025.
2. Defense One. “China’s burgeoning drone arsenal shows power of civil-military fusion.” June 17, 2025.
3. TVP World. “Russia triples drone output with Chinese help as it launches record strikes on Ukraine.” July 9, 2025.
4. The New Voice of Ukraine. “Russia produces over 2500 Shahed drones each month — HUR.” June 9, 2025.
5. Defense One. “Drones are now bullets: How a new Pentagon policy may accelerate robot warfare.” July 11, 2025.
6. Wikipedia. “M4 Sherman.” Accessed July 12, 2025.
7. Defense News. “US Army plans to dramatically accelerate Abrams tank modernization.” April 14, 2025.
8. Defense One. “Pentagon looks beyond primes for cheaper drones.” June 3, 2024.
9. Costs of War Project, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. “Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020 – 2024.” July 8, 2025.
10. Taxpayers for Common Sense. “Political Footprint of the Military Industry.” Accessed July 12, 2025.
11. Atlantic Council. “Ukrainian innovations are redefining the role of drones in modern war.” June 10, 2025.
12. Associated Press. “Trump caught off guard by Pentagon’s abrupt move to pause Ukraine weapons deliveries, AP sources say.” July 8, 2025.